It is Donald Trump’s world now. Nowhere was this more obvious than at the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) latest annual gathering in Davos. Since the 1970s, the WEF has been an integral part of the liberal international order that emerged from the ashes of the second world war. It is where the world’s political and economic elites come together to discuss global risks and explore solutions to collective challenges such as climate change, rising inequality, and the rise of artificial intelligence. In this sense, the 55th Davos summit was a continuation of a longer-running tradition.
And yet, nothing about this year’s gathering was normal, because it coincided exactly with Trump’s second inauguration as president of the United States. Trump’s return to the White House marks the start of an anti-Davos age. Gone is any sense of a global order in which countries pursue joint solutions to shared problems. We are entering a “polyworld” governed by polycentrism, polycrisis, and polysemy (when a word or symbol has multiple meanings).
A polycentric world lacks not only a single order but also any desire to create one. America’s new secretary of state, Marco Rubio, made the administration’s position clear in his confirmation hearing: “The postwar global order is not just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us.” And notwithstanding what Chinese leaders tell global gatherings, they are not in the order-building business either. When Chinese leader Xi Jinping speaks of “great changes unseen in a century,” he is not referring to the emergence of a Chinese-led world. Rather, he is instructing Chinese society to prepare for a long period of chaos and disruption.
Moreover, Trump’s desire to upend the global order is surprisingly popular around the world. ECFR has just conducted a poll showing that most people around the world welcome Trump with open arms. They believe he will be good for the US, good for their own countries, and conducive to world peace. They like the idea of the US becoming a “normal power.”
No longer can we expect middle powers such as India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, or South Africa to shore up a single US-centred order. In the polycentric world, each of them thinks of itself as a serious power—as a centre, rather than as part of the periphery. The only countries that are nervous about Trump are America’s closest allies in Europe and Asia, since they have long based their own security and prosperity on the notion of American exceptionalism.
The second feature of the moment is the polycrisis. Climate change, new technologies, demographic trends, and the shifting nature of capitalism will create continuous disruptions. But unlike single acute crises (like a financial collapse), the polycrisis will not foster unity or a desire for common rules. Instead, the multitude of simultaneous challenges will generate competition for attention; climate will have to compete with migration, Gaza with Ukraine, and so forth.
The upshot is a fragmented world of different tribes with different priorities. As the crises worsen, each will inevitably be weaponised in ways that lead to further fragmentation. Since the first thing that happens in a crisis is a suspension of rules, the rule-based order will give way to a perpetual state of exception.
The third feature is polysemy. The new crises are taking us into unknown territory, not least because they are interacting with one another in complex and unpredictable ways. Everyone will believe what they want to believe. How can we agree on rules and norms when we no longer agree on basic facts?
The defining global challenge is no longer to combat disorder, because a state of disorder implies some common agreement on what order should look like. What we have instead is “unorder”: the very idea of order has been overtaken by events.
Now that Trump is starting to implement his policies in earnest, we will see if the global south’s enthusiasm for his presidency lasts
In a private meeting at Davos, I heard one political leader advise others to “chill out” and not feel obliged to respond to all of Trump’s talk of tariffs and territorial expansion. Rather than organising the global resistance to Trump, most are looking for ways to advance the WEF’s globalist goals in the context of the new polycentric world. But now that Trump is starting to implement his policies in earnest, we will see if the global south’s enthusiasm for his presidency lasts.
Trump won’t mean the end of Davos. Business and political leaders will continue to gather there long after he has gone. But the liberal international order of which the WEF was a pillar is unlikely ever to return to its postwar form. The agenda there – and at the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other institutions – will need to be revised accordingly.
This article was first published on Project Syndicate on January 27th 2025.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
