Peace seems to have broken out between India and China. On Oct. 23, 2024, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had their first bilateral meeting since 2019. Statements from the foreign ministries of both countries declared a “resolution of issues that arose in 2020,” referring to the crisis that began when Chinese troops launched a number of incursions across the Line of Actual Control — the disputed border between the two countries — in Ladakh. Under the terms of a new “disengagement” agreement, China withdrew its forces from the remaining places where they had crossed the border in 2020, and both sides’ militaries have resumed patrolling in the same areas as they had before the Chinese incursions.
However, despite the apparent easing of tensions between the two countries, the Ladakh crisis of 2020–24 will cast a long shadow over India’s security and role in the region. The period of acute crisis itself was a valuable learning experience for both sides: China likely gleaned important tactical and strategic insights on India, while India developed a new understanding of the threat posed by China. The October deal does not, therefore, restore the status quo ante — there is no going back. But how, exactly, has the crisis affected India’s national security over the long term?
The lasting impact of the Ladakh crisis should be measured in three dimensions. First, the crisis compelled India to intensify its military balance on the Line of Actual Control, but it remains unclear whether that has strengthened its conventional deterrence against China. Second, the crisis compelled India to reinforce its northern border at the expense of military modernization and naval force projection in the Indian Ocean. It remains to be seen whether that change will be reversed. Finally, the Ladakh crisis cratered India’s relationship with China and nudged it towards closer cooperation with the United States. The trajectory of India’s relations with both Beijing and Washington also remains an open question.
In each of these dimensions, the effects of the crisis between India and China that began in 2020 will be felt for many years.
A New Phase of an Entrenched Rivalry
The Ladakh crisis began in May 2020, when India discovered multiple, near-simultaneous Chinese incursions across the Line of Actual Control and into the Indian-administered territory of Ladakh. A skirmish at one of the incursion points, the Galwan river valley, killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops — the first loss of life on the border in nearly half a century. In the weeks that followed, the two sides scrambled to gain positional advantage in a series of moves and countermoves. Front lines were reinforced with massive troop build-ups on both sides, warning shots were fired, and tensions mounted. India in effect froze the bilateral relationship, suspending most diplomatic mechanisms, banning some Chinese apps from Indian smartphones, and tightening rules governing Chinese investment in India, especially in sensitive sectors such as telecommunications. New Delhi argued that the broader relationship could not continue while the border remained under threat by Beijing. Then, stepping back from the brink, the two countries’ militaries “disengaged” their forces from a number of friction points between 2020 and 2022, and imposed new buffer zones to keep their soldiers at arm’s length. Despite the partial disengagement, two Chinese incursions, at Depsang and Demchok, remained impervious to round after round of inconclusive military talks — until now.
The October 2024 agreement resolves those last two sticking points at Depsang and Demchok. India and China have agreed to dismantle their encampments from 2020 and restore each other’s access to patrolling points that had been blocked during the crisis. The Indian official statement heralded a “complete disengagement and resolution of issues that arose in 2020.” In this framing, the border crisis is over, and the two countries have now opened a pathway to normalization. New Delhi and Beijing immediately announced the reopening of diplomatic mechanisms at ministerial and officials levels, and in multilateral organizations. Their respective foreign and defense ministers implemented that order quickly, meeting on the sidelines of the November G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, and announcing further tentative steps to ease relations. And in December, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval travelled to Beijing, resuming “special representative” talks that had been suspended since the crisis began and pledging to restore other cross-border engagement such as trade and religious pilgrimages. After four years of suspended diplomacy, these discussions are all important steps towards normalization.
With this nominal resolution to the crisis, India and China have entered a new phase in their relationship. No longer overshadowed by Ladakh, there are now opportunities for mutual gain, especially in trade and investment. The official Chinese statement repeatedly underscored the line that the two countries are both major developing economies that need to cooperate. Despite the latest easing of tensions, however, the relationship will not return to the status quo ante. New Delhi, for its part, has developed a healthy distrust of Chinese strategic intent and compliance with past or future border agreements. But for now, both sides have agreed to a marginally more stable border, characterized by renewed diplomatic contact and the prospect of reinvigorated economic cooperation.
Many of the specific details of the new deal remain uncertain or undecided. It appears, for example, that the buffer zones at earlier disengagement sites such as Galwan and Pangong Tso will remain in place, although it is unclear if patrolling will eventually return to pre-crisis patterns there. Similarly, some reporting suggests the deal also sets terms for other disputed points of the border beyond Ladakh — such as Yangtse, the site of another scuffle in December 2022 — although the exact scope of the deal is not fully known. Neither side has addressed whether India and China will seek to codify their agreement with a new confidence-building agreement or revert to the earlier agreements signed between 1993 and 2005, which New Delhi accuses China of violating. And while India may have declared “disengagement” to be completed, there are no indications of when or even whether it will be followed by de-escalation and de-induction of forces, as prescribed by India’s crisis policy. A permanent settlement of the contested border is a different and currently implausible proposition, requiring agreement on its demarcation and delineation that has eluded the two countries since they began negotiations in the 1950s.
Nevertheless, disengagement should be cautiously welcomed. It reduces the risk of accidental escalation, gives India an opportunity to relax its resource-intensive posture on the border, and opens channels of communication for managing the broader bilateral relationship. But the context also matters. The real impact of the October deal will not depend on how the deal was struck or its implementation, but on the future military balance and diplomatic ties between India and China.
Deterrence on the Contested Border
The first key factor determining the long-term implications of the Ladakh crisis is the military balance on the Line of Actual Control. Both sides quickly reinforced their forward-deployed positions, built or upgraded significant new infrastructure such as air fields and roads, and introduced an array of new technologies, from drones to portable field hospitals. India has significantly reinforced its positions on the contested border, reassigning one of its three Pakistan-focused Strike Corps on China, and reassigning other formations to a border security role. The build-up has occurred not only near the sites of China’s 2020 incursions into Ladakh, but all along the Line of Actual Control, including the eastern sector in and around the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its own.
The impact of the military build-up on both sides of the border remains unclear. It is an open question whether India is any better postured to deter Chinese aggression than it was in 2020, when it offered no meaningful deterrence. Some episodes before and during the Ladakh crisis may offer some insight here. First, in an incident at Doklam in 2017, Indian forces impeded a Chinese attempt to build a road in disputed territory, and forced the Chinese to back down after a stand-off lasting over two months. But in the months and years that followed, China garrisoned significant forces and supporting infrastructure on its rear areas near the stand-off site, in effect creating a far more potent military threat at a strategically sensitive area of the Line of Actual Control. Separately, at the height of the Ladakh crisis in August 2020, Indian forces surprised Chinese troops by occupying previously vacant heights in the Kailash range. The new positions offered Indian forces better observation and lines of fire. Yet, they were subsequently relinquished in a deal for local disengagement. This instance of “quid pro quo,” according to the Indian Army — an offensive maneuver to gain bargaining leverage — demonstrated a willingness to take operational risk under certain circumstances. In another episode, at Yangtse in 2022, Indian forces mobilized rapidly to interdict a Chinese incursion, leading to another fracas. Significantly, the Indian forces received early warning of the Chinese movement, probably from the United States, and responded quickly — exhibiting newfound capabilities to monitor and secure the Line of Actual Control.
With the October 2024 deal appearing to resolve the Ladakh crisis, India and China will both continue to adjust their military posture near the shared border. If New Delhi has learned anything from the crisis, it is that India’s national security cannot depend on Chinese goodwill. While a positive sign, one-on-one meetings alone cannot impose stability — India needs reliable conventional deterrence on the border. China will very likely continue to probe the Line of Actual Control in the future, as it has done regularly in the past. The military balance that has emerged on the border since 2020 may allow India to preempt Chinese probing more effectively. On the other hand, the added military power and readiness may shorten the escalation ladder and make skirmishes more likely.
India’s Competing Strategic Priorities
The second key factor determining the Ladakh crisis’ long-term effects is India’s overall strategic posture, namely the extent to which defending the Line of Actual Control continues to dominate Indian strategic planning. The motivations for China’s 2020 incursions remain a mystery, but their effect has been clear: The seriousness of the threat prompted India to heavily reinforce its military presence on its northern border. This build-up came at the cost of Indian investments in military modernization, especially in force-projection capabilities in the Indican Ocean. New Delhi’s closest regional security partners, such as Australia and the United States, rely on India being more capable and active to deter Chinese aggression and provide security in the Indian Ocean region. To secure these expanding national interests, India had invested more in its naval capabilities from 2000 to 2020, including in various types of major surface combatants and advanced maritime patrol aircraft.
Since the Ladakh crisis began in 2020, those investments slowed drastically. In the face of a suddenly urgent threat on the Line of Actual Control, New Delhi calculated that military readiness on the border was a higher priority than modernization. The government therefore approved no new major naval initiatives after 2020, in contrast to a comparatively higher rate of new initiatives in the previous two decades. The Indian navy continues to be undeniably active, for example in countering piracy and exercising with partners. Moreover, long-running procurement programs that began years or even decades before the Ladakh crisis, including new drones and its indigenous aircraft carrier, continue to bear fruit. But without new programs since 2020, the Indian fleet will struggle to compete with a growing Chinese maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.
The new deal over Ladakh offers New Delhi an opportunity to rebalance its strategic priorities. With reduced tensions on the border, India could adjust the balance between readiness and modernization. Indian political and military leaders would have to reconcile these imperatives for modernization and projection with the imperative of establishing a robust military deterrent on the border. In some cases, such as building naval capability, this will require tough trade-off decisions. But in other cases, for example from electronic warfare to the long-mooted integrated rocket force, modernization would significantly improve India’s deterrent on the border.
The Broader Indian-Chinese relationship
The final factor of the long-term implications of Ladakh is the broader bilateral relationship between India and China. The crisis immediately cratered whatever trust New Delhi had in Chinese motives and behavior and hardened Indian elite opinion about China’s role as the country’s primary strategic competitor. That is unlikely to change. At the same time, the Indian public grudgingly acknowledges the reality that China is a next-door neighbor with a huge economy that India cannot ignore — certainly not if it seeks to fulfill its own great-power ambitions. Thus, despite the trade and investment restrictions the Indian government imposed, two-way trade increased to unprecedented levels during the crisis. Some Indian businesses — and even some public institutions — had been urging the government to normalize relations to facilitate greater economic exchange. These overtures resonated with Chinese narratives, which insisted the two countries should focus on their shared interest in mutual growth and development, and not be distracted by territorial disputes.
At the same time, the crisis also underscored the value to India of its growing strategic partnership with the United States. Not only does cooperating with Washington help India to build national power, but it also helps India to manage relations with China in very specific and concrete terms. In February 2024, India’s then-defense secretary, Giridhar Aramane, unguarded in a closed-door meeting, bluntly admitted that India had depended on U.S. intelligence during the Ladakh crisis and would “expect” close coordination if a similar scenario unfolds in the future. The burgeoning technology-sharing relationship between India and the United States has emerged as a core element of the partnership, because it has the potential for long-term economic and military benefits for both countries. Alas, skepticism about America’s intentions will persist in some quarters in India, as it always has. However, the national security interests-based foundations of the partnership — designed to build Indian power and bolster the regional status quo — remain firm. Many Indian analysts anticipate that the new Trump administration will continue to strengthen ties with New Delhi. More broadly, the Ladakh crisis also renewed Indian enthusiasm for “minilateral” groupings such as the Quad — comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States —– as a preferred mechanism to advance a shared policy vision for the region, including on security.
In the months and years ahead, the challenges for India — and any other country managing a complex relationship with China — will be one of policy coordination. New Delhi will have to grapple with the tension between deepening bilateral engagement with Beijing for mutual benefit, while simultaneously limiting engagement for national security reasons. India will likely cordon off some critical sectors such as telecommunications, but beyond setting those uncontroversial limits, it will need some coordinated national strategy to ensure its different policy imperatives do not undermine each other.
Looking Beyond Ladakh
The Ladakh crisis of 2020–2024 will cast a long shadow over India’s national security and threat perceptions for the foreseeable future. While the recent military disengagement between India and China along the Line of Actual Control is welcome news, it will not automatically resolve the long-term challenges borne by the Ladakh crisis.
India still faces diabolical challenges in establishing deterrence on its northern border, realigning its strategic posture, and managing its bilateral relationship with China. Nevertheless, the October 2024 disengagement deal offers Indian government officials and military planners, and their American partners, an opportunity to re-examine and recalibrate their approach to these priorities. How India handles them will determine the long-term significance of the Ladakh crisis, and India’s role as a strategic force in the Indo-Pacific.
Arzan Tarapore is a research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and a visiting research professor at the China Landpower Studies Center at the U.S. Army War College.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any other entity of the U.S. government.
Image: Government of India via Wikimedia Commons.
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