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The Return of God?
Zdeněk Petráček looks at the biggest problem facing monotheism.
The problem of evil is one of the most profound philosophical challenges to the belief in an omnipotent God. How can the existence of evil and suffering be reconciled with an all-powerful good God? Epicurus is said to have provided a thought-provoking formulation of the problem at around the turn of the third century BCE, which can be summarised:
“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”
These inquiries encapsulate the crux of ‘the problem of evil’ (also called ‘theodicy’): if God allows evil’s existence, does this not cast doubt upon either his benevolence or his omnipotence? The tension posed by Epicurus’s questions challenge the foundations of monotheism.
Before diving into the problem of evil, it’s crucial to establish clear definitions of the key terms. Omnipotence means “being all-powerful, possessing unlimited capabilities and control” (Cambridge Dictionary). If we refer to God as omnipotent, we mean he has unlimited powers over our lives and everything else in the universe. Benevolence denotes the disposition to do good: good will, kindness, or the love of mankind accompanied by a desire to promote happiness. These attributes have long been associated with God, forming the foundation of monotheistic conceptions of a supreme being. Meanwhile, malevolence is “the quality of causing or wanting to cause harm or evil” (Cambridge Dictionary).
“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.”
This is Epicurus’ first assertion. Someone might counter-argue that a greater purpose or higher good served by the existence of evil may justify God’s merely apparent inability to prevent it. For instance, evil in the world allows for the exercise of free will, the development of certain virtues, and the growth of moral character. God in his wisdom may prioritize these ends over the immediate eradication of evil.
From this perspective, God’s omnipotence is not undermined, but rather redefined, to include voluntary constraints based on a broader understanding of his character and purposes. However, as David Hume argues in his Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion (1779), extreme cases of suffering, such as that in genocides or significant natural disasters, seem disproportionate to any conceivable greater purpose or higher good. And on the other hand, even without such pervasive evil, life presents us with numerous obstacles to be overcome by applying virtues and moral qualities which are developed in the face of these obstacles.
Free will is often invoked to explain the existence of moral evil, which is to say, evil committed by people as opposed to natural disasters. The contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga, in his free will defense, argues that even an omnipotent being cannot do self-contradictory things like creating a square circle or controlling someone without violating their autonomy (God, Freedom, and Evil, 1977). However, some atheists argue that the very notion of an all-knowing deity contradicts the concept of free will. Simply said, if God knows our future decisions, then they are fixed in advance, so we have no free will, and the free will argument collapses.
One last question is, could virtues be developed in a world without evil? Virtues like compassion and empathy could probably still develop, as even in a world without pervasive evil there could still be more minor difficulties that would help people to understand and support each other during challenging times. However, courage may be less relevant or may not have the same urgency in a world without evil, since it is usually associated with facing and overcoming evil, taking risks, or standing up for one’s beliefs.
“Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.”
Epicurus’ second assertion is that if God can prevent evil but lacks the willingness to do so, then divine benevolence is undermined. The notion that greater good is achieved through the existence of evil again might be used to justify God’s apparent indifference to instances of intense suffering. But one could argue that the existence of unnecessary and gratuitous suffering, such as child abuse or natural disasters causing widespread devastation, raises profound ethical concerns here. If an all-powerful God possesses the ability to prevent such suffering but chooses not to intervene, it challenges the traditional understanding of benevolence. So judging whether God is malevolent requires a broader perspective beyond individual instances of suffering. A comprehensive evaluation of God’s benevolence should take into account the entirety of life, including the potential long-term consequences of allowing evil. Human (lack of) understanding could be preventing us from fully grasping the ultimate reasons that God allows evil. However, I would argue that even when considering the broader perspective, there remain cases of extreme suffering that seem incompatible with the idea of a perfectly good God: the concept of a benevolent deity cannot, unqualified, genuinely account for the existence of such intense and unnecessary forms of evil. Even given the argument of virtues developing through facing evil, we have to ask what virtues are developed by genocide or child abuse.
In my opinion, there is suffering across the globe that cannot be explained by developing virtues or by people’s free will. To believe that we are developing our virtues on a social scale through facing evil, history would have to not repeat itself. But if after multiple horrors we still live in a world where racism and other prejudices are still thriving, we did not develop such virtues, even though we’ve lived through great expressions of such evils.
“Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?”
Epicurus’ third assertion questions the source of evil if God possesses both the ability and willingness to prevent it. As stated, one could argue that God’s granting of free will allows for the possibility of moral choice that could lead to committing evil acts. That means that the origin of and responsibility for evil acts lie within the people who commit them, and therefore it’s their exercise of free will that leads to suffering and harm. From this perspective, God’s ability and willingness to prevent evil do not negate the existence of evil, but instead prioritise human autonomy and moral responsibility. However, contrary to that argument, I can again point out that natural evils, such as diseases, earthquakes, and other sources of suffering not caused by human actions, also exist. Therefore the question mutates: if God is both able and willing to prevent natural evil, why does natural evil persist? A theist might say in response that natural evils are a consequence of the natural laws that govern the universe, and the intricacies of the natural world and the laws of cause and effect lead to outcomes that may result in suffering or loss of life, but are necessary for the functioning of the physical world. Therefore, while they cause pain, they are not indicative of God’s malevolence or a failure of divine power and benevolence. But in contrast to that argument, someone could say that the occurrence of natural evils, such as widespread diseases or natural disasters causing unimaginable suffering and loss of life still poses a question as to why a loving and compassionate deity would create a world in which such natural evils occur in the first place.
“Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”
Epicurus’ fourth assertion challenges the traditional monotheist conception of God.
A tsunami Hokusai, 1832
Human limitations plausibly prevent us from fully comprehending the nature of God and His reason for allowing evil. We could argue that despite our inability to understand the divine plan, religion still retains its significance and meaning, since religious belief can provide individuals with a sense of purpose, moral guidance, and comfort in the face of evil. However, if a deity lacks the attributes traditionally associated with the monotheistic concept of God such as omnipotence and benevolence, then it becomes questionable whether the term ‘God’ is still applicable.
Contrary to that, we could say that the limitations of human understanding should not invalidate religious experience, a personal sense of connection to the divine, or other arguments for monotheism. Someone could also assert that while the problem of evil challenges our intellectual comprehension, the existential and spiritual dimensions of monotheistic faith can transcend the limits of our rational explanations, to offer solace, ethical guidance, and a framework for moral reasoning even in the face of the philosophical challenges. However, while personal experiences and subjective beliefs hold value, the problem of evil necessitates rigorous intellectual engagement and logical consistency in our conceptions of God. Thus we should question the coherence of invoking the word ‘God’ when the attributes traditionally associated with God are compromised. So the problem of evil still challenges us to critically examine and refine our understanding of God, seeking logical coherence and philosophical rigor.
Conclusion
The problem of evil remains one of the most enduring philosophical challenges, confronting both theology and philosophy with one of the most difficult questions about the nature and character of God. By examining four assertions regarding God’s capacity and willingness to prevent evil, we’ve explored the tension between the existence of evil and the belief in a deity who is both omnipotent and benevolent. We have engaged with a range of perspectives, from the defense of free will as a justification for moral evil, to the idea that natural evil is an unavoidable consequence of the laws of the universe. Some classical theodicies offered valuable insights, but ultimately fell short of fully accounting for the disproportionate and gratuitous suffering present in the world for all of human history.
At the heart of this debate lies the question of free will. Plantinga and others argue that moral evil is an inevitable consequence of human autonomy. However, as we have seen, this argument falters when addressing natural evils not due to human agency. The persistence of such evils continues to challenge traditional monotheistic views.
The problem of evil serves as a reminder of the complexity of human existence and the limitations of our understanding. It compels us to question long-held beliefs, to engage with suffering in all its forms, and to try to build more compassionate world, even in the face of life’s difficulties. Whether we come from a theistic or an atheistic perspective, it remains a profound challenge, urging us to never stop exploring the boundaries of human comprehension and moral reasoning.
© Zdeněk Petráček 2024
Zdeněk Petráček is a Czech university student of Religious Studies and Ancient Greek Language and Literature, with a focus on early Christian literature and its intersections with ancient philosophy.
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