U.S.-ROK: Indispensable Partnership Amid Increasing Geopolitical Competition Given November 22, 2024 in Washington, DC
Thank you, and it’s an honor to be here today for the Korea Society’s Van Fleet Signature Policy Event. I’m grateful to the Korea Society for hosting us here in the spirit of General Van Fleet, who enhanced the cultural wealth of our two countries and strengthened the friendship forged on the battlefields of Korea. I’m glad to be here to celebrate the enduring bond of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and to acknowledge our important achievements over the past several years.
As you are all aware, the security environment in the Indo-Pacific is growing both more complex and more dangerous. The regional security landscape is heavily impacted by China’s rapid military modernization, increasing provocations abroad, and comprehensive repression at home. Meanwhile, the DPRK continues to expand its nuclear and missile capability to threaten deployed U.S. forces, the ROK, and others in the region. Last year, the Kim regime abandoned the long-standing policy goal of peaceful reunification on the Korean Peninsula and ratified this change into its constitution earlier this year. We’re also seeing continued DPRK efforts to fortify its side of the Military Demarcation Line and persist with provocations near the Northern Limit Line. And of course we are deeply troubled to see the DPRK implemented a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia, and has sent arms, ammunition, and – most recently – soldiers to fight in Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war against Ukraine, the consequences of which are reshaping security conditions in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. These developments are introducing new levels of unpredictability. And to withstand those pressures, our responsibility is to harden and strengthen mutual reliance and mutual trust, first in the U.S.-ROK relationship and then beyond.
In 2023, we commemorated the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and set the alliance on a new path with a new Defense Vision for the alliance, rooted in three pillars: strengthening extended deterrence, modernizing alliance capabilities, and bolstering regional cooperation.
2024 has been a year of delivering on those new commitments. And our work together has had transformative effects on the Alliance. Only a few weeks ago we conducted the 56th Security Consultative Meeting, and the Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting – otherwise known as a 2+2 – and I’d like to take stock of the key accomplishments coming out of these two events.
First, and perhaps most importantly, we have swiftly advanced our work on nuclear deterrence through the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group. Key elements include:
- security protocols and expansion of information sharing;
- nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies;
- nuclear and strategic planning;
- ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency through conventional-nuclear integration;
- strategic communications;
- exercises, simulations, training, and investment activities; and
- risk reduction practices.
We also completed the Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula which provide an even firmer foundation for enhancing U.S.-ROK extended deterrence cooperation in an integrated manner.
Now, that is all a lot of wonky Washington DC words and doesn’t make for a pithy and ear-catching lunch presentation, but I can assure you that all of those words and the concepts that they represent are deeply important, both to how we will operate together and to how we will convince the adversary that they have a lot to lose if they pick a fight. We spend a lot of time in our bilateral discussions dissecting these words and pressure-testing these concepts in order to maintain the advantage and therefore maintain deterrence.
And amidst this ongoing work, we continue to expand the scope and scale of exercises to maintain a strong combined defense posture through our most important bilateral exercises, Freedom Shield and Ulchi Freedom Shield. This year’s Ulchi Freedom Shield underscored our enduring military partnership and combined ability to adapt to evolving threats. It incorporated lessons learned from recent conflicts and will continue to evolve with more realistic, multidomain crisis and conflict scenarios on the Peninsula. We have also made key upgrades to information sharing and missile defense capabilities that enhance our combined ability to detect and respond to DPRK missile threats, including new and advanced DPRK capabilities. We remain postured to deal with the broad range of security challenges together.
Second, we are modernizing our capabilities by expanding science and technology cooperation. At the SCM, our defense leaders announced the establishment of the Defense Science and Technology Executive Committee to guide and prioritize Alliance defense science and technology cooperation. This committee will advance innovation and transform our military force with cutting-edge technologies. We have an ambitious agenda including autonomy, artificial intelligence, and crewed-uncrewed teaming. We are learning the lessons of Ukraine, and it is clear that the combination of mass and precision will be essential in a future fight. The United States and the Republic of Korea have a great deal of combined expertise that can keep us steps ahead of the adversary.
Across the board we are bolstering our defense industrial cooperation to develop, acquire, and maintain capabilities at the speed of relevance. I was in Seoul last week and had to pleasure of thanking ROK leadership for their support of the newly-launched Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience. Also known as PIPIR, this is a multilateral forum comprised of Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic allies and partners collaborating to strengthen defense industrial resilience in the Indo-Pacific region. Alongside Seoul and a dozen other capitals, we are creating the first ever consortium to support defense armaments requirements across the globe, unlocking new sources of supply, capturing new production arrangements, and ensuring that we can increase the time on station of key assets and platforms with smarter logistics and forward repair and upgrade.
Indeed, I applaud ROK participation in aviation and ship maintenance projects, improving the interoperability and interchangeability of our defense industrial bases. Hanwha Group’s acquisition of the Philly Shipyard is an example of South Korea’s major investments in the U.S. shipbuilding industry, showcasing the opportunities for industrial base collaboration.
We welcomed the recent conclusion of consultations related to the 12th Special Measures Agreement and look forward to its ratification by the ROK National Assembly. This will put us in a durable position with U.S. forces based in South Korea going forward. And it is an important time to put some emphasis on how we share the burden and the responsibility for security in this critical part of the world. The next administration will undoubtedly look to understand these arrangements for themselves.
I would add that sharing responsibility is not just about defense spending or SMA contributions. The ROK’s high-tech industrial base can provide a concrete and tangible contribution to sharing the burden of maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. And ROK support to others in the region is also a part of working together for our mutual security benefit. More to say on that in a moment.
We are also adapting to evolving threats in the region. At the 2+2, we announced that Article 3 of the Mutual Defense Treaty applies in the space and cyber domains in certain circumstances. We also affirmed the need to strengthen information sharing and joint response capabilities against increasing space and cyber threats.
Finally, we have made historic strides in bolstering our multilateral cooperation, including through trilateral security cooperation with Japan. In the 15 months since President Biden, President Yoon, and Prime Minister Kishida met at Camp David in August 2023, our three countries have made rapid progress. Last December, we activated a mechanism that allows us to share early warning DPRK missile data in real time, and we use it on a regular basis. We also executed the first two iterations of the Freedom Edge exercise, which operates across multiple domains such as air, sea, and cyber and is the first trilateral exercise to have its own name. Freedom Edge demonstrates the unbreakable will of our countries to safeguard freedom and ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, including the Korean Peninsula. These achievements were underpinned by the close communication between our defense leaders, who met three times in one year. This included the Trilateral Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo, which marked the first time our defense leaders met in Japan, and where they signed a Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework to institutionalize and deepen our cooperation. Next year, our defense leaders will make history again by holding a Trilateral Ministerial Meeting in the ROK for the first time.
The shared vision of the Alliance extends beyond the Peninsula. Both the United States and ROK have a common view of an Indo-Pacific region that is free, open, prosperous, and secure. Recognizing our shared interests, we developed and endorsed a new framework to advance our respective security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. This framework will allow us to deepen and expand U.S.-ROK cooperation in Southeast Asia and with the Pacific Islands. Yesterday was a great example. The ROK Minister of National Defense joined Secretary Austin and his Japan, Australia, and Philippines counterparts in Laos for a meeting focused on assisting the Philippines with its defense requirements.
As the former Director for Defense Policy at the U.S. Mission to NATO, I am especially proud of the expansion of cooperation between the ROK and NATO after the upgrade of its relationship last year. Following the DPRK’s deployment of forces to Russia, the ROK briefed the senior-most decision-making body at NATO, the North Atlantic Council. I’ve heard from my former colleagues that this was one of the most productive exchanges between NATO and its Indo-Pacific Partners. I am convinced that NATO has a lot to gain from drawing closer to South Korea and others in the region. The world is getting smaller, and we need to do everything we can to keep it stable.
So that is a lot, and I apologize for the long list, but I want to convey just how hopeful I am about the work we have done and the work we have ahead.
We’ve continued to deliver and build on unprecedented cooperation over the last four years. I’m confident that our bond – not only over the last four years, but also the past 71 years of our Alliance – is enduring and built to last.
Our collective security efforts are decades in the making – and together, we’ll continue to solve the world’s most pressing problems. I look forward to your questions.
